What was the stratagem CIP’s essential for the Warlords [WIB]?
The Eurasian Great Game divided three chunks and the “CIP” was the second chunk of Asian surrogacy that related from the Korea War to Vietnam War at least about “Jet-engine generation” (Korea for testing “Jet fighter”, Vietnam stand for “Jet transport” plus “Helicopter turbo-jet”. Vietnam was typical testing area, but based on dispensing warplanes and the costumers were the crucial criteria requirement, it is a matter of principle in industrial production, the native peoples and almost three million U.S combat troops took turn rotations becoming the airline-passengers who also for the real practical combat training troops (the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with the peaceful methods, the total influence – economic, political, even spiritual was the goals so that security and liberty may prosper together. That’s Permanent Government’s motto)
So why, officially the war in Vietnam was being won as 1962 ended. But underneath the optimistic rhetoric of the top command, a few respected civilian and military officials were already beginning to raise serious questions about the progress of the war? Two of the most determined voices of dissent belonged to Mike Mansfield [influenced by Prescott Bush in the senate committee] the new Senate Majority Leader, and Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann [a soldier cast in the American hero mold: “duty, honor, and country”] a U.S military adviser to the South Vietnam armed forces, Army 7th Division/4th Corp.
Mike Mansfield, a man of insight into Asian affairs. In 1944 as a young congressman and former professor of Far Eastern history, he had been dispatched by President Roosevelt on the fact-finding mission to China by suggestion from A Harriman. His report that Communist China strength was impressive, and not limited to revolutionary ideologues, raised eyebrows in the clique Skull and Bones but eventually proved prophetic. 18 years later Mansfield again packed his suitcase for the Far East at a president’s request, but this time his destination was Saigon. An early supporter of the Diem regime with a simple purpose pried the French off and out away from Vietnam by used Diem as crowbar tool. But skeptical and independent minded, Mansfield was determined to find out for himself what was going on in the American-financed war.
In short, the purpose for his fresh look at the South Vietnam situation was a simple words “a costly and long war” and “The struggle for Vietnamese independence was fast becoming apply the “CIP” or stand for “American War” raising serious questions about the nature of U.S involvement in Southeast Asia.
Mansfield’s private report to the President was more specific, and even more pessimistic. He told Kennedy that American programs in South Vietnam both military and nonmilitary – had been ‘ill conceived and badly administered’ and that South Vietnam was ‘far more dependent on us for its existence than it was five years ago’
In order to protect the Ho Chi Minh trail with any price for performing his stance axiom 1
Indeed, it was distressing on the Mansfield’s visit to bear the situation described in much the same terms as “on my last visit in 1957…” South Vietnam, outside the cities, is still an insecure place which is running at least at night largely by the Viet Cong. The government in Saigon is still seeking acceptance by the ordinary people in large areas of the countryside. Out of fear or indifference or hostility the peasants still withhold acquiescence, let alone approval of that government…Mansfield concluded “It would be well to face the fact that we are once again at the beginning of the beginning.” –That meant “a costly and long war” due to CIP stratagem, he meant. In contrast, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann shared many of Mansfield’s misgivings but not his doubts about the necessity of American intervention in the Southeast Asia. An ardent anti-communist who had volunteered for active duty in Vietnam, Vann believed that US military aid and know-how were essential to maintaining a free South Vietnam. Vann was assigned as a senior advisor to the ARVN 7th Division, the spearhead of the government’s pacification efforts in the southern Delta, and quickly learned the depressing facts of life in the war against the Viet Cong. Alas! We called the battle of Ap Bac what it was – a defeat, and a bad one.
John Paul Vann dogged by his shameful secret, though he was defeated at the battle of Ap-Bac – Vann left the army that he loved. President Johnson confidently dispatched him back to Vietnam in 1965 as a civilian worker in the Pacification program (against the thoughts of Skull and Bones via Henry Cabot Lodge, ambassador) Johnson as same Kennedy want him repeated anything that Diem administration done for success the Strategic-Hamlet-Program:
Diem stated 3,225 hamlets were achieved for the program to 11,316 hamlets, that meant 33 percent rural population or 4, 3 millions people situated inside the Strategic hamlets safety protected by government.(because the CIA warrant special US watchfulness and concern in their view… and A Harriman said “With the passage of time, our objectives [CIP] in Vietnam will become more and more difficult to achieve with Diem in control and his outcome of Rural-Revolutionary-Development-Pacification Strategic Hamlet Program if becoming success)
On October/1962 President Diem was elated at the speech: “All for Strategic Hamlet Program” The situation that military and political declined sharply from present levels. Thereby Skull and Bones couldn’t realize the essential CIP – How they reacted?
After Diem assassination and Johnson on office, the new program was the biggest single effort to pacify the countryside since Diem’s Strategic Hamlet Program. The core manpower for the teams already existed in mass-produced replicas of the armed propaganda teams Frank Scotton had formed with CIA help in Quang Ngai province in 1964.
Ironically, the CIA officials also found themselves embroiled with the Vietnamese officer they had selected to head the GVN side of the program, Lieutenant Colonel Tran Ngoc Châu. He in turn had been responsible for bringing Paul Vann into the program and was to become Vann’s closest Vietnamese friend. Châu was one of those extremely rare ARVN officers who had actually fought against the French in the Viet Minh, in Châu’s case for almost four years. He was from a venerable family of centre Vietnam of Hue mandarins who had shared the common disgrace of their class by collaborating with the colonizers, yet always uneasily. During WWII, Châu and two of his brothers joined the Viet Minh. Châu proved to himself an able Viet Minh fighter, rising from squad leader to acting battalion commander. His dilemma was that he was too temperamental to endure the self-effacement and group discipline the Vietnamese Communist. Party demanded of its cadres but too ambitious not to want to keep rising in the world.
His two brothers had no difficulty making the career progression from member of the Viet Minh to member of the Party. Châu couldn’t bring himself to join the Party. In 1949 Châu deserted and soon afterward entered Bao Dai’s French-sponsored army. Châu’s American friends saw his virtues and never questioned him closely enough to understand why he had parted with the Communists. They interpreted the reasons he did give as politics and principle rather than temperament and character. To Vann, to Dan Ellsberg, who also became his friend, and to Bumgardner and others, Châu was the epitome of a good-Vietnamese. He had winning qualities. Like Paul Vann, he could be astonishingly candid when he was not trying to manipulate. He was honest by Diem’s regime standards, because though advancement and fame interested him, money did not. He was sincere in his desire to improve the lives of the peasantry, he was real patriot, even if the system he served didn’t permit him to follow through in deed, and his nearly four years in the Viet Mina and his highly intelligent and complicated mind enabled him to discuss guerrilla warfare, pacification, the attitude of the rural population, and the flaws in Saigon society with insight and wit. The difficulty with the Saigonese, he would say, was that they were Vietnamese-foreigners.
Châu and Vann had first met at Ben Tre Province in mid-1962 when Diem had appointed Châu chief of Ben-Tre, then the most troubled province in the northern Mekong-Delta. The relationship had been a quarrelsome one during Vann’s first year, because Châu, flattered by the attention and promotions his president was giving him, was an ardent Diemist at the time.
Still, the two men had said goodbye with respect, and after Vann’s return in 1965 the friendship grew. In Ben Tre Province, Châu had also formed his connection with the CIA. While he was no more successful when the results were counted than other province chiefs (it was from Châu’s strategic hamlets that the Viet Cong recruited most of the 2,500 volunteers, they raised in Ben Tre for new battalions in the Spring of 1963 right after the battle of Ap Bac)
Châu was an exception in that he seriously tried to pacify his province. The CIA officials involved in pacification had been drawn to him by this attitude and by the same qualities that attracted Vann. The Agency had financed several experimental programs Châu had started, including one to eliminate members of the clandestine Viet Cong government in the hamlets with squad of gunmen akin to the CIA’s assassination squads, the so-called Counter Terror Teams. By the end of 1965, when Gordon Jorgenson, the station chief, and Tom Donohue, his officer in charge of the Political Action Teams (PAT), needed a Vietnamese director for the pacification-worker project they were supposed to run jointly with AID, Châu was logical choice. Châu had then brought Vann into the project by requesting that he be appointed Châu’s AID advisor, in effect the manager of the AID side.
The Agency had been so impressed with Scotton’s innovation that later that year it had built a large camp at Vung Tau to turn out similar 40 men commandos. They were called PAT for short. By the beginning of 1966 the CIA had trained roughly 16,000 Vietnamese as PAT. The Vung Tau Camp had sufficient barracks and other facilities to handle 5.000 men at a time. It was now to serve as the national training center for the pacification workers, with the 16,000 Vietnamese already trained there as PAT to be utilized as pacification team members. The goal, which Vann expected to be revised upward, was to field a force of about 45.000 pacification workers, approximately 30,000 of them by the end of 1966. They were to be dressed in the black-pajama garb of the peasants and to be called “Cadres” officially Revolutionary Development Cadres, in yet another American attempt to imitate the Vietnamese Communists.
The CIA station chief in Saigon, Gordon Jorgenson and his deputy official in charge of the PAT they had already trained and fielded were doing serious damage to the Viet Cong. In fact, the special quality of Scotton’s innovation had been lost as soon as it was mass-produced. After training, the PAT was also given to the province and district chiefs to employ against the guerrillas. The CIA officials who worked in the provinces usually did not accompany the teams on operations. They depended on the province and district chiefs to tell them how effective the PAT were, and these Saigon-officials eager for more CIA money and armed manpower to protect themselves, were engaged in the usual confidence game.
Jorgenson and Donohue viewed pacification as a largely repressive task of identifying and eliminating the cadres of the clandestine Viet Cong government and wiping out the local guerrillas. Their misimpression about the effectiveness of their commandos led them to think the PAT was ideal for this mission. They wanted to keep the PAT training program and 40 men team makeup virtually unaltered and merely give the PAT a new name and use them in a pacification role. Vann had no quarrel with the repressive aspect of pacification; he took it for granted. With his newly acquired ideas on social revolution, he didn’t think it was enough. He felt there had to be an element of social and economic change too in order to gain the cooperation of the peasantry and wanted to expand the teams into 80 men groups to include enough specialists for better village and hamlet government and for health, agriculture, education improvement work. Expanding the teams to meet these goals would naturally require altering the training program at the Vung Tau Camp as well.
By March 1966, when a compromise was finally reached over the nature and size of the pacification teams and they were set at 59 men each, the dispute had become so heated that Jorgenson and Donohue wondered why they had ever thought so highly of Châu. Vann and Donohue decided they liked each other despite their differences, but Jorgenson had had enough of the pesky Vann.
Who was a new figure in Vietnam, Mr. William Porter Lodge’s deputy ambassador? Porter had just been given supervision over all civilian pacification activities as a result of another strategy conference convened in Honolulu in February by President Johnson. Jorgenson complained to Porter that Vann was a rash empire-builder who was disrupting a marvelous program to try to gain control of it. Porter, fifty-one years old in 1966 and a thirty-year veteran of the Foreign Service, was new to Vietnam and Asia. It seemed to me he was persuaded by Harriman, ambassador at large in Africa, Porter also was one of the State Department’s close-friend with the Skull and Bones founder, as senior Middle-East specialists. His previous overseas post had been as ambassador to Algeria. Now he was content with downgrade as deputy ambassador to Cabot Lodge, should be a complete stranger to me. He might have taken the word of a CIA station chief had Vann not learned that something unusual was going on at the Vung Tau Camp.
Richard Holbrooke, the fledgling of 1963 who had wanted to hide as Halberstam banged his fist on the restaurant table and shouted for a firing squad for Harkins, had been made an assistant to Porter, because he was one of the few Foreign Service officials with field experience in pacification. He had spent the better part of a year between 1963 and the summer of 1964 as AID representative in Ba Xuyen province in the lower Mekong Delta. Holbrooke couldn’t believe what he was hearing when Vann suddenly appeared in Porter’s outer office one day and started to tell him what was happening at Vung Tau Camp. Porter’s other aide was Frank Wisner II, the eldest son of the famous chief of clandestine operations at CIA. Young Wisner had chose not to fellow his father into the Agency and instead to seek his career with the State Department. He had been assigned to Saigon 1964 and was by now accustomed to surprises. He also found Vann’s story too fantastic to credit.
The CIA’s commando training program had been ‘captured’, Vann said, by an adherent of an obscurantist Vietnamese political sect and was being used as a cover to secretly spread the anti-communist but also anti-Saigon doctrines of the sect. The sect adherent was the commandant and chief of instruction at the Vung Tau Camp. A captain in the ARVN signal corps named Le Xuan Mai was propagandizing all of the trainees through the political instruction course that was part of the curriculum and was also planting cells of four men indoctrinated with the ideas of his sect in each of the PAT teams graduating from the camp. He was carrying on right under the noses of Jorgenson and Donohue and their subordinates. None of the CIA staff at the camp spoke Vietnamese, and neither Jorgenson nor anyone beneath him had ever been curious enough to have the political lessons translated. Châu had discovered what was occurring and alerted Vann after they had gone to Vung Tau to begin reorganizing the camp for its pacification mission.
Holbrooke and Wisner checked out the story. When they discovered it was true, they scheduled an appointment for Vann with Porter. A previous meeting they had set up for Vann to explain his side of the pacification team dispute to Porter had not gone well for Vann. The Lodge’s deputy ambassador had heard a great deal about Vann from Jorgenson beforehand, and all of it had been bad.